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B. Exhibit #1 was a document which should have 
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own business records and should have been 
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discovery requests. 
C. Testimony was elicited from both the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant regarding said exhibits and 
the transactions related thereto. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 
78-2a-3(d). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS 
CORRECT. 
Standard of Review — Conclusions of law are accorded no 
particular deference, but rather are reviewed for correctness. 
Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The 
appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 
1989). 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING EXHIBITS 1 AND 7 AND RELATED TESTIMONY. 
Standard of Review — "It is well settled that trial court 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not to be overturned 
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." State v. 
Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) citing State v. Gray. 717 
P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). "In reviewing 
questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given 
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to the trial court's advantageous position; thus, that court's 
rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned absent an 
abuse of discretion. •• Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 
P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d at 1316. 
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Standard of Review — The review of issues of fact is 
"strictly limited." Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Company, 846 
P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah App. 1993); Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. 
of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Kimball 
v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). "When challenging the 
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and demonstrate that 
despite such evidence the factual findings are clearly erroneous." 
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah App. 1992); Hoth v. 
White, 799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App. 1990). The appellate court 
will view the facts from the record "in the light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings." Hoth v. White at 216, citing State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 474 (Utah 1990). 
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Standard of Review — See standard at I. above. 
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Standard of Review — A trial court's grant or denial of a 
motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 
(Utah 1988); Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d 
1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Moon Lake Electr. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. 
Constr. Inc. . 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
appellate court shall "presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a 
request for discovery with a response that was complete when made 
is under no duty to supplement his response to include information 
thereafter acquired, except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his 
response with respect to any questions directly addressed 
to (A) the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness 
at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to 
testify, and the substance of his testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior 
response if he obtains information upon the basis of 
which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect when 
made, or (B) he knows that the response though correct 
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when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance 
a knowing concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by 
order of the court, agreement of the parties, or at any 
time prior to trial through new requests for 
supplementation of prior responses. 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon 
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal to this Court from the trial court's 
entry of a Judgment against the Plaintiff, entered on March 15, 
1993, after a bench trial and after the trial court's denial of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify or in the Alternative for a New Trial, 
filed July 8, 1993. The underlying case involves the Plaintiff's 
suit to recover moneys owed to the Plaintiff for goods and services 
provided to the Defendant by the Plaintiff in the course of repair 
of the Defendant's truck, and a counter-claim by the Defendant for 
damages sustained by the Defendant due to the Plaintiff's loss of 
the transmission from the truck and the Plaintiff's damage to the 
engine of the truck. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
A. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendant on 
March 27, 1992, alleging Breach of Contract and unjust enrichment 
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based on the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff for parts and 
labor rendered by the Plaintiff on behalf of the Defendant. 
B. On April 17, 1992, the Defendant filed an answer and 
Counterclaim alleging damages resulting from the loss of a 
transmission and damage to the engine of a truck through the 
negligent actions of the Plaintiff. 
C. The Plaintiff filed an answer to Defendant's Counterclaim 
on May 13, 1992. 
D. The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's 
Counterclaim, based on the Statute of Limitations, on May 13, 1992. 
E. On August 25, 1992, Judge S. Mark Johnson entered an order 
denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. 
F. On December 17, 1992, the Defendant filed a Motion to 
Recuse Judge Johnson. 
G. Judge Johnson subsequently recused himself and Judge 
Dutson heard the case. 
H. Trial was held on February 16, 1993, at 9:00 a.m., in the 
Bountiful Circuit Court. 
I. At trial, the court again denied Plaintiff's Motion to 
Dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim. 
J. Defendant's Exhibit #1 was admitted into evidence over 
the Plaintiff's objection. (Record at 236-239). 
K. The trial court found that the Plaintiff had in fact sold 
the Defendant a rebuilt transmission for his trust for $3,299.27. 
L. The trial court found that said transmission subsequently 
disappeared while in the possession of the Plaintiff. 
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M. The trial court found that the Plaintiff had a duty to 
the Defendant to protect the transmission from loss and that said 
duty was breached. 
N. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Dutson granted 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,054.69 plus 
prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% and judgment in favor of 
the Defendant in the amount of $3,299.37 plus prejudgment interest 
at the rate of 10%. (Record at page 171). 
0. The trial court found that, after off-setting Plaintiff's 
claim against the Defendant, the Defendant was damaged by the 
Plaintiff's loss of the transmission in the amount of $3,314.29. 
(Record at 282-285). 
P. Judgment was entered against the Plaintiff March 15, 
1993, in the net amount of $3,314.29. 
Q. On March 25, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend 
the Judgment or in the Alternative for a New Trial. 
R. On May 17, 1993, Judge Dutson denied the Plaintiff's 
Motion noting that the Court's decision on the Judgment was based 
on a "totality of the evidence presented at trial..." (Record at 
120) . 
III. DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT 
At the close of the trial, the trial court rendered an oral 
decision awarding the Plaintiff judgement against the Defendant in 
the amount of $1,054.69, plus interest at 10% from September 1987, 
through the date of trial in the amount of $580.09. The Defendant 
was awarded judgement against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
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$3,299.37, plus interest at 10% from September 1987, through the 
trial date in the amount of $1,649.70. Off-setting the Plaintiff's 
judgement against the Defendant's judgment allows for a total 
judgment in favor of the Defendant against the Plaintiff in the 
amount of #3,314.29 to accrue interest from the date of judgment. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June of 1987, the Defendant had the Plaintiff install a 
rebuilt transmission in his truck for $3,299.27. (Record at 234-35, 
258-259). Defendant's truck broke down in January of 1988 and he 
hired the Plaintiff to repair said truck. The Plaintiff had the 
truck brought to his shop, where he removed the transmission and 
then discovered that there were serious problems with the engine. 
At the request of the Defendant, the Plaintiff placed the 
transmission and other parts into the bed of the truck and parked 
it on his lot. The Defendant decided that rather than repair the 
truck he would sell it with a good transmission and a bad engine. 
The Defendant sold the truck to Steven Flanders and when Mr. 
Flanders retrieved the truck from the Plaintiff's shop on or about 
April 1, 1988, the transmission was missing. At the time of trial, 
the transmission had yet to be turned over to Mr. Flanders or the 
Defendant. The Defendant is responsible to Mr. Flanders for the 
transmission or reimbursement for the value of said transmission 
(Record at 177-178) and, therefore, the Defendant was damaged by 
the Plaintiff's loss of said transmission in the amount of 
$3,299.37. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff's argument on appeal can be broken down into 
three chronological stages: 
1) Pretrial — Whether the Defendant's counterclaim 
should have been dismissed based on the statute of 
limitations; 2) Trial — Whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in admitting evidencef whether the trial 
court's findings were clearly erroneous, and whether the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in entering judgment 
in favor of the Defendant; 
3) Post Trial — Whether the trial court abused it's 
discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. 
It is clearly the accepted law in Utah that a counterclaim 
that was not barred at the commencement of the action will not 
thereafter be barred. The Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 
27, 1992. The Plaintiff claims that the facts establish April 
1, 1988, as the date of the event giving rise to the claim — 
nearly four years prior to the commencement of Defendant's action -
- and that the statute of limitations on said counterclaim is four 
years. The Plaintiff will not argue these points as they are not 
at issue on appeal. Rather, under existing Utah law and applying 
the Defendant's interpretation of these facts, it is clear that the 
Plaintiff's counterclaim was not barred under the statute of 
limitations on March 27, 1992, and therefore was not barred when 
actually filed on April 17, 1992. Therefore, the trial court 
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properly denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the court on 
appeal must affirm the trial court's ruling. 
The Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused 
its discretion in allowing appellee to introduce Exhibits 1 and 7 
and to elicit testimony related to said exhibits. To the contrary# 
the record clearly supports the trial court's exercise of 
discretion and therefore the court on appeal must affirm the 
court's ruling. 
The Defendant has further failed to marshal the evidence to 
show that the factual findings of the trial court were clearly 
erroneous. Rather, the record clearly supports the trial court's 
findings that the Plaintiff had a duty to protect from the loss of 
the transmission, that the transmission was lost, and that the 
Defendant was damaged as a result of the loss of the transmission. 
The appellate court, viewing the record in the light most favorable 
to the findings, must uphold the trial courts findings of fact. 
Based on its findings the trial court was correct in entering 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. The trial court found that the 
Defendant was responsible for the loss of the Plaintiff's 
transmission and that said loss damaged the Plaintiff in the amount 
of $3,299.37. Therefore, the trial court correctly ordered 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the above-stated amount. 
This decision of the trial court was clearly proper and the court 
on appeal must affirm said judgment. 
Finally, the Defendant completely fails to show an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Defendant's 
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Motion for a New Trial. The trial court's decision was based on a 
totality of the evidence and the trial court was definitely in a 
better position to judge the evidence presented and the credibility 
of the witnesses at trial. The record clearly supports the court's 
judgment and there being no abuse of discretion the court on appeal 
must affirm the trial court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Conclusions of law are reviewed by the appellate court for 
correctness and are accorded no particular deference. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). In reviewing the trial 
court's order of judgment against the Appellant, the appellate 
court should use the trial court's findings of fact and apply the 
proper rule of law. 
The Appellant argues that the applicable statute of 
limitations had run on the Appellee's counterclaim and therefore 
the counterclaim should have been dismissed. Assuming, arguendo. 
that the Appellant is correct in placing the date of the event 
giving rise to the claim at April 1, 1988, and further assuming 
that the four year statute of limitations as provided in Section 
78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code is the correct statute for this action 
(both issues being questions of fact not at issue on appeal), the 
counterclaim was properly before the court and the trial court was 
correct in denying the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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"While there is a difference of opinion on the question, the 
majority of the courts hold that a counterclaim based on a cause of 
action which is not barred at the time of the commencement of 
plaintiff's action is not thereafter barred because not pleaded 
before the expiration of the full statutory time." Lewis v. 
Merrill, 365 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Sup.Ct. of Or. 1961); 34 AmJur. 205, 
Limitations of Actions § 249; 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 
285 p. 342; Annotation, 127 A.L.R. 909. 
In Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"a counterclaim which arises out of the transaction alleged in the 
complaint and is in existence, at the time the complaint is filed, 
and is not then barred by a statute of limitations, will not be 
barred by the running of the statutory time thereafter. The 
statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed." Doxey-
Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
A more recent Utah case which follows this reasoning, Moffitt 
v. Barr, provides an explanation of the policy and reasoning behind 
such a rule, detailing three reasons why a counterclaim such as the 
one in the instant case should not be barred. 
First, the court in Moffitt indicates that such a dismissal of 
a counterclaim would "provide unscrupulous plaintiffs with a means 
of sabotaging a defendant's right to assert a valid counterclaim." 
Moffitt v. Barr, 837 P.2d 572, 574 (Utah App. 1992). 
Secondly, the court in Moffitt states that "statutes of 
limitation are designed to promote justice, by discouraging delay 
in litigation and preventing surprise through the revival of stale 
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claims." Id. at 574 (Citations omitted). To allow a dismissal of 
the counterclaim in the present action would actually reward the 
Appellant for delaying in filing his action until nearly the end of 
the statutory time thereby prolonging the litigation process. 
Finally, the court in Moffitt states that an interpretation 
such as that supported by the Appellant "penalizes 'reluctant' 
litigants, i.e., those who would rather avoid litigation than 
assert the claims they possess, and who take the basically non-
litigious position that they will assert their claims only if the 
other party brings litigation to fruition by filing a complaint 
against them, their real preference being to stay out of court 
altogether." Id. at 575. 
Therefore, Appellee's counterclaim was clearly timely filed 
and the trial court's denial of the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss 
was correct. To overturn the trial court's ruling would be 
completely against the intent of limitation statutes. The 
Defendant would have preferred to stay out of court, having agreed 
to drop his claim at the offer of the Plaintiff to "forget the 
bill" on the defective work on the truck. (Record at 247). 
Defendant further testified that he just wanted to sell the truck 
and did not want to sue to get it fixed. (Record at 256). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS ONE AND SEVEN AND ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY REGARDING SAID EXHIBITS. 
"It is well settled that trial court rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are not to be overturned in the absence 
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of a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 
883 (Utah 1988) citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 
1986); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). "In reviewing questions of 
admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial 
court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings regarding 
admissibility will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 
(Utah 1990) citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d at 1316. 
"The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the 
appellate court will presume that the discretion of the trial court 
was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the 
contrary." Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah 
App. 1991)/ (Citations omitted). 
In the present case, the Appellant has failed to show that the 
trial court abused its discretion. To the contrary, the record 
clearly indicates that the trial court acted within its discretion 
in allowing the Appellee to introduce said exhibits and testimony. 
While the documents were not actually provided during the discovery 
process, the Appellee did put the Appellant on notice of the 
existence of the documents and the fact that they had yet to be 
located. Further, Exhibit #1 was a document originally initiated 
by the Appellant which should have been readily available within 
the Appellant's normal business records amd which the Plaintiff 
should have produced in response to the Defendant's discovery 
requests. (Record at 201). Also, the trial court provided the 
Appellant with every opportunity for voir dire and examination. 
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The Plaintiff's objection to the admissibility of the exhibits 
and testimony is based solely on Rule 26(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This rule in pertinent part provides that a party 
must "seasonably" amend a prior discovery response when "he knows 
that the response though correct when made is no longer trust and 
circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in 
substance a knowing concealment." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(e)(2). The 
Plaintiff's argument fails on several major points. 
First, the response to discovery was correct and true and the 
Defendant contended throughout the discovery process that he had 
purchased a rebuilt transmission from the Plaintiff and that he 
knew that somewhere there existed documentation of said purchase. 
The Defendant even attempted to discover this documentation from 
the Plaintiff, who failed to produce the document in response to 
the Defendant's discovery. (Record at 201). 
Second, even if the discovery of Exhibits #1 and #7 could be 
considered a change to a response the failure of which to amend 
would constitute a "knowing concealment" under Rule 26, the rule 
clearly states that the party must "seasonably" amend the response. 
Defendant's counsel stated at trial in response to the Plaintiff's 
objection to the admission of the exhibit that the exhibits were 
produced just that morning (Record at 201). This statement was 
corroborated by the Defendant's testimony that he finally found the 
documents with his tax information. (Record at 250). Producing the 
exhibits at trial with the Plaintiff being given adequate 
opportunity for voir dire and examination easily constitutes a 
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seasonable amendment under the circumstances. 
Finally, even if Exhibits #1 and #7 were not admitted, they do 
not go to a material question of fact which could not have been 
proven easily in some other manner. The Plaintiff claims error 
based on the admission of these exhibits, but fails to show that 
such admission affects a "substantial right" of the Plaintiff as 
required in Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Basically, 
the exhibits were used to set a value for the transmission, and not 
to prove the elements of the Defendant's counterclaim. Even 
without the exhibits, the record clearly supports the trial court's 
findings that the Plaintiff lost the Defendant's transmission 
thereby damaging the Defendant. The Defendant could have produced 
additional evidence on the question of damages if, in the court's 
discretion, such information was necessary. 
The record clearly supports the trial court's rulings 
regarding said exhibits and testimony and the Plaintiff has failed 
to show an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court 
should uphold the trial court's ruling. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
The Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the 
following: 
1) Appellee purchased a transmission for his Ford truck from 
the Appellant; 
2) Appellee paid Appellant $3,299.37 for said transmission; 
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3) Appellee was damaged by the loss of said transmission in 
the amount of $3,299.36; 
4) Appellee's Exhibits #1 and #7 represented receipts for 
payment by Appellee for said transmission. 
The appellate court's review of issues of fact is "strictly 
limited." Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Company, 846 P.2d 1323, 
1328 (Utah App. 1993) citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of 
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); and 
Kimball v. Campell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). Further, the 
Appellant "must marshal all the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings and demonstrate that despite such evidence the 
factual findings are clearly erroneous." McPherson v. Belnap, 830 
P.2d 302, 304 (Utah App. 1992) citing Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 
216 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis added). 
The Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence and has 
failed to show that the trial court's findings were "clearly 
erroneous." .Id. at 304. Rather, the Appellant has selectively 
presented a portion of the evidence as found in the record to 
attempt to prove his version of the facts. The trial court was 
clearly in the best position to weigh all of the evidence, which 
included testimony and exhibits from both the Appellant and the 
Appellee, and make the factual findings based on the totality of 
said evidence. 
As for the specific findings challenged by the Plaintiff, the 
record clearly supports the findings. The Defendant's exhibits #1 
and #7 document the Defendant's purchase of a transmission from the 
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Plaintiff for the amount of $3,299.37. This fact is further 
supported by the testimony of Hugh Williams (Record at 240-241, 
250) and Duffy Williams (Record at 258). 
The fact that the Defendant was damaged is proven by the 
testimony of Steve Flanders, a friend of the Plaintiff's and the 
person who purchased the subject truck. Mr. Flanders testified 
that he expected to receive either the transmission or 
reimbursement for said transmission from the Defendant. (Record at 
177-178). This fact is further supported by the testimony of the 
Defendant (Record at 255). The Plaintiff would like the appellate 
court to believe that because Mr. Flanders had not yet been 
reimbursed by the Defendant for the missing transmission at the 
time of trial, Mr. Flanders was not looking to the Defendant for 
reimbursement — a twist on the facts which would completely 
contradict the direct testimony of Mr. Flanders himself. 
Based on the Appellant's total failure to marshal the evidence 
and the fact that the appellate court is to review the facts from 
the record "in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings," Hoth v. White at 216, citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 
474, 474 (Utah 1990), the appellate court in the present action 
must uphold the trial court's findings of fact. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE. 
Again, conclusions of law are reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
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The facts as shown at trial support the Appellee's argument 
that: 
1) Appellee's truck had a transmission when the Appellant 
took possession of the truck for the purpose of repairing said 
truck (Testimony of Plaintiff — Record at 211-212, Testimony of 
Defendant — throughout, Testimony of Duffy Williams — Record at 
263); 
2) Said transmission had a value of $3,299.37 (Exhibits #1 
and #7, Testimony of Defendant — Record at 234-236, 250); 
3) Said truck was sold by Appellee with a transmission to 
Steve Flanders (Testimony of Defendant — Record at 245-246, 
Testimony of Steve Flanders — Record at 176-177); 
4) Said transmission was missing from the truck when Steve 
Flanders received the truck from the Appellant (Record at 179-180 
amd 196); 
5) At the time of trial, Steve Flanders was still looking to 
the Appellee to provide the transmission or compensation for said 
transmission (Record at 177-178); 
6) Appellee was, therefore, damaged in the amount of 
$3,299.37 by the Appellant's loss or conversion of the 
transmis s ion. 
Therefore, the trial court properly ordered judgment for the 
Appellee to compensate him for the Appellant's acts as related to 
the missing transmission. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT OR 
FOR A NEW TRIAL • 
Again, the trial court's decision will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Moon Lake Electr. Ass'n. v. 
Ultrasvstems W. Constr. Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
In the present case, the Appellant argues that the Appellee 
committed perjury and therefore the trial court's judgment should 
have been amended or, alternatively, a new trial should have been 
granted. In the court's finding on this question it clearly states 
that its decision was based on "a totality of the evidence 
presented at trial, not just the documentation relied on by 
Plaintiff. Additionally, the Court considered the demeanor of the 
witnesses as they testified, and was persuaded that Plaintiff's 
testimony was not reliable, either because of loss of recollection, 
lack of knowledge claimed, or intentional falsification. •• (Record 
at 120, emphasis added). 
The trial court was in the best position to weigh the evidence 
and judge the credibility and truthfulness of the witnesses. 
Merely making unsupported accusations of perjury can not possibly 
meet the requirement of showing an abuse of discretion. As 
demonstrated earlier, there are more than adequate facts within the 
record to support the trial court's decision and, therefore, the 
appellate court should affirm said decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings were clearly within its discretion 
and its Order for judgment against the Plaintiff was clearly 
correct. Therefore, the court on appeal should affirm the trial 
court's order. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that the Judgment entered by 
the trial court be affirmed and that the Defendant be allowed to 
pursue collection of said judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1994. 
DEL "6. ROWE 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellee 
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APPENDIX A 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
II. FINDING REGARDING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
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DEL B. ROWE (#2813) 
Attorney for Defendant 
535 West 500 South #4 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 ______ 
Telephone: (801) 298-0640 yP^'Jajfer* 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT *Wf} T,* 
oooOooo A ' ^ ^ O ^ v 
NELSON'S DIESEL SERVICE, ) ^^""-* 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920000260CV 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HUGH WILLIAMS, 
Defendant. ) 
oooOooo 
This matter was tried before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson on 
February 16, 1993, and pursuant to the testimony the file, the 
evidence and argument the court makes the following findings of 
fact: 
1. That the Defendant had the Plaintiff install a rebuilt 
transmission in Plaintiff's truck in June 1987 for $3,299.77. Said 
full amount was paid the Plaintiff by the Defendant on August 17, 
1987. 
2. That the Plaintiff did other repair on the Defendant's 
vehicle on about August 28, 1987 in the sum of $565.91 and the 
Plaintiff did further work on the said same truck on September 28, 
1987 in the sum of $488.78 for a total due the Plaintiff by the 
Defendant of $1,054.69. 
3. The Defendant had not, prior to trial, paid the Plaintiff 
for this work. The Defendant owes these amounts to Plaintiff plus 
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interest to February 16, 1993 of 10% until judgment is entered. 
4. On January 11, 1988 the Plaintiff was called by the 
Defendant's to diagnose a noise in the engine of said truck which 
was disabled at Honda of Bountiful. The Defendant diagnosed said 
vehicle erroneously and drove the vehicle to 2600 Sout£\800 West in 
Bountiful where the engine froze and then said m vehicle was 
towed to Plaintiff's business. It was then discovered after the 
Plaintiff removed the Defendant's transmission that it was in fact 
a piston that was frozen in the engine. That it is why this noise 
problem caused the engine to stop. 
5. The Defendant then sold said vehicle to one Flanders 
representing that it had a bad engine but that the transmission was 
good which representations were made by the Defendant to Mr. 
Flanders. 
6. Plaintiff took out the transmission and lost it on about 
January 11, 1988. However, Plaintiff had a duty to protect said 
transmission but breached said duty by losing said transmission. 
7. The value as of January 11, 1988 of said transmission was 
$3,299.37 as it was installed in June of 1987 by the Plaintiff for 
the Defendant. There was no diminution of value from June of 1987 
to January 1988. The Plaintiff owes the Defendant the sum of 
$3,299.37 for said lost transmission plus interest at 10% from 
January 11, 1987 until judgment is entered. 
8. Pursuant to the allegations of the Defendant that the 
Plaintiff damaged the engine, the Defendant has not proven said 
point and, therefore, should not receive judgment on damages to the 
engine. -27-
9. The court finds that the parties are to bear their own 
attorneys fees and costs. 
10. The claim for $236.40 by the Plaintiff against the 
Defendant is hereby dismissed. 
11. Flanders was told by the Defendant that the transmission 
went with the truck. 
12. Mr. Williams did in fact tell Mr. Flanders that he would 
therefore get a transmission for the truck as the Plaintiff had 
lost said transmission to said truck. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact the court makes the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
1. That judgment be entered for the Defendant on his 
counterclaim against the Plaintiff in the sum of $3,299.37 with 
statutory interest of 10% from January 11, 1988, to present in the 
sum of $1,649.70, for a total of $4,949.07. 
2. The Defendant shall be given judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the sum $1,054.69 plus statutory interest of 10% from 
September 1987, to present in the sum of $580.09, for a total of 
$1,634.78. 
3. Therefore, the net judgment for the Defendant against the 
Plaintiff shall be $3,314.29 plus interest at 12% per annum from 
the date judgment is entered. 
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4. The parties bear their own costs and fees. 
DATED this // day of Fobruaryr 1993. 
BY THE^CQURT 
JUDGE/ROGER S. DUTSON 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was mailed to: CHARLES A. SCHULTZ, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 345 East 400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 1993. A 
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/]U 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPTARTMENT 
NELSON DIESEL SERVICE 
Plaintiff 
VS 
HUGH WILLIAMS 
Defendant 
FINDING 
92-260 
This Court has reviewed Plaintiff's motion to modify or amend 
Judgment or for a New Trial. Without considering the issue of 
timeliness of said motions, the Court notes that the decison made is 
based on a totality of the evidence presented at trial, not just the 
documentation relied on by Plaintiff. Additionally, the Court 
considered the demeanor of the witneses as they testified, and was 
persuaded that Plaintiffs testimony was not reliable, either because 
of loss of recollection, lack of knowledge claimed or intentional 
falsification. The Court denies Plainfiff's motion dated 3-25-93. 
Dated this /T^of May, 1993 
Hon. Reger S. Dutson 
Circuit Court Judge 
-30- MAY141993 
SHAaONMuWES.cier-, 
fourth Circuit Court 
"^r+To** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the t /nV^ dav of June, 1994, I caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to be 
delivered to the persons at the addresses listed below by 
depositing copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Appellant 
P.O. Box 1516 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
At 
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